A manager pursuing a general protections claim against Queensland’s Office of Industrial Relations without a lawyer will face private counsel at hearing. Industrial Commissioner Knight granted the agency leave to be legally represented on 22 September 2026, over the applicant’s objection.
The decision is [2026] QIRC 301. Leave was granted under s 530(1)(e)(ii) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), on the ground in s 530(4)(a), which asks whether representation would allow the case to be run more efficiently in light of its complexity. The order leaves intact Crown Law’s separate entitlement under s 530(5)(a) to appear for the State without leave.
An industrial tribunal may give leave under subsection (1) only if – (a) it would enable the proceedings to be dealt with more efficiently, having regard to the complexity of the matter; or (b) it would be unfair not to allow the party or person to be represented because the party or person is unable to represent the party’s or person’s interests in the proceedings; or (c) it would be unfair not to allow the party or person to be represented having regard to fairness between the party or person, and other parties or persons in the proceedings.
Five alleged adverse actions, at least six decision-makers
The applicant is employed at classification level AO8 and has not been at work since May 2025. Her s 309 application claims the agency took adverse action against her because she had exercised workplace rights and because of her impairment.
On her Statement of Facts and Contentions, the workplace rights included an email she sent in September 2023, while acting as Director, raising concerns about workloads, and concerns she raised at a meeting in February 2024 about a conflict of interest and compliance with recruitment processes. Five adverse actions are said to have followed, among them a reprimand by her Director, being left out of further acting Director opportunities and comments her Director made about her. She also alleges her position was removed in a restructure in May 2025 without consultation, while she was on approved leave, and that information about the change was kept from her. The remedies sought include compensation for past and future economic loss and superannuation, general and aggravated damages, and penalties, in a claim exceeding $3 million.
The agency denies contravening s 285 or s 295. It says the acting roles stopped after the applicant herself disclosed a conflict of interest in November 2023 and indicated she would decline future acting appointments, and that the Deputy Director-General made the restructure decision for operational reasons without removing her from her position. It has also applied to strike out parts of her Statement of Facts and Contentions, an application that has not yet been decided.
that the matter turns on contested facts and is likely to require credit findings about multiple witnesses, and that counsel would ensure evidence is presented “with care and precision”, that only material relevant to the facts in issue reaches the Commission, and that unnecessary disclosure of evidence at the hearing is avoided. It also argued that counsel’s specialist skills improve efficiency even where Crown Law is already acting.
that the features Crown Law identified were common to adverse action hearings generally and said nothing about what made this dispute complex; that Crown Law had shown “complete capability” and no task had been identified that it could not perform; and that the claimed efficiencies were really advantages in advocacy for the agency, whereas s 530(4)(a) looks to the needs of the Commission rather than a party’s preferences. She relied on State of Queensland v Dodds [2021] ICQ 007, in which the State was refused private counsel where Crown Law could already appear.
that the question had to be answered by reference to the controversy in this particular case rather than general protections litigation at large, and that Crown Law’s affidavit material described the case in terms broad enough to fit a great many proceedings. Reading the parties’ material and reaching her own view, she was satisfied the controversy carried both factual and legal complexity and that counsel would enable it to be dealt with more efficiently.
What the Commission found complex
Six features are identified in the decision: at least two proscribed reasons and five adverse action events spread over a long period, with adverse actions taken by at least six different officers; the threshold question of whether the September 2023 email and the February 2024 meeting involved the exercise of a workplace right under s 284; the presumption in s 306, which puts the onus on the agency to show the action was not taken for the reason alleged; a broad factual dispute in which the agency contests nearly every paragraph of the applicant’s contentions; material covering events from 2017 onwards; and a claim for relief above $3 million that contemplates future economic loss being apportioned across two proceedings against different agencies. The contested strike-out application was treated as adding to the complexity rather than removing it.
Knight IC said the s 306 presumption requires the agency to call each decision-maker whose conduct is challenged and to lead evidence about why particular decisions were made, a task Industrial Commissioner Pratt had described as the stock in trade of counsel. She rejected the argument that Crown Law’s capability answered the statutory question, noting that capability is the subject of s 530(4)(b), a ground the agency did not rely on.
No order to fund the other side’s lawyer
The applicant said she was acting for herself out of necessity, had been without income since September 2025 and had a psychological injury, and described the contest as one injured individual without a lawyer facing a State agency, Crown Law and private counsel. If leave were granted, she argued, fairness could be preserved only by directing the agency to fund representation of equivalent standing for her.
Knight IC said she could appreciate why the applicant might feel overwhelmed at the prospect of facing counsel, and accepted that her present circumstances are challenging. She held that the absence of a lawyer on one side does not by itself make representation of the other side unfair, that the Commission regularly manages hearings in which a party appears without a lawyer, through directions, the framing of the issues, the handling of objections and explanation of the process, and that a barrister’s paramount duty is owed to the Commission and the administration of justice. The model litigant principles binding the State were a relevant consideration, and Crown Law said it would instruct counsel to comply with them.
She found nothing in s 530 that would support a condition requiring the agency to pay for the applicant’s representation, holding that the section is concerned with “fairness in the conduct of the proceedings”.
Leave in these circumstances, she said, “is not granted to create a power imbalance between the parties” but “to support the efficient conduct of the proceedings”.
At a glance
- Parties: A self-represented applicant v State of Queensland (Office of Industrial Relations)
- Citation: [2026] QIRC 301, Industrial Commissioner Knight, 22 September 2026, heard on the papers
- Sections: Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ss 529, 530(1)(e)(ii), 530(4)(a), 530(5)(a); substantive claim under ss 284, 285, 295, 306, 309
- Outcome: Leave granted for the agency to be represented by a lawyer, including counsel; Crown Law’s entitlement to appear preserved
- Who it affects: Self-represented applicants and State respondents in Queensland general protections proceedings
The same applicant has a separate general protections claim arising from a secondment in 2024. In that matter, [2026] QIRC 289, Industrial Commissioner Pratt granted the Queensland Police Service leave to be legally represented on 11 September 2026, also over her objection, finding that the threshold question of whether a workplace right had been exercised, the s 306 presumption and disputed facts requiring credit findings meant the case would run more efficiently with lawyers.
Both decisions draw on State of Queensland (Queensland Health) v Hume [2022] ICQ 001, where it was held that a matter need not be complex, or more complex than others coming before the Commission, for s 530(4)(a) to be available; what the provision requires is that regard be had to whatever complexity the matter carries. The strike-out application in the Office of Industrial Relations proceeding is yet to be determined.
Source: [2026] QIRC 301
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