Ulan Coal Mines Pty Ltd v Association of Professional Engineers, Scientists and Managers, Australia: FWC tasks

The Full Court treated compulsory multi-employer bargaining as a break from bargaining by joint will and asked whether the Commission attended to each statutory precondition as the Act requires. The Fair Work Commission now applies it in single interest employer authorisations and appeals, and it is cited on judicial review of supported bargaining authorisations.

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Why is Ulan Coal Mines Pty Ltd v Association of Professional Engineers, Scientists and Managers, Australia relevant to workplace disputes in Australia?

The Full Court’s decision describes the bargaining streams in the Fair Work Act as a break from agreements made by the joint will of employers and employees. It frames review of the Commission’s work around a single question: whether the Commission attended to the task each statutory precondition sets. The decisions OnNotice has reported also cite it for the rule that a tribunal is not readily taken to have overlooked a matter, and for the role the scope of an application plays in testing the preconditions.

It is cited in single interest employer authorisations, in an appeal to a Full Bench of the Fair Work Commission, and on judicial review of a supported bargaining authorisation.

How the Commission and the courts use it

Type of matter What the decision said What it means
Single interest employer authorisation – Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia v O’Connors Mechanical Construction (SA) Pty Ltd, Watson Fitzgerald and Associates Pty Ltd, D&E Air (s.248)
[2026] FWC 2649
“Ultimately, it is a question for the Commission to be satisfied of whether the majority “want to bargain”.” (set out in [2026] FWC 2649) The Commission drew on it in deciding whether a majority of employees wanted to bargain and whether the rebuttable presumption had been overcome, and it then issued the authorisation.
Appeal (s.604)
[2026] FWCFB 196
“An inference that a matter has been overlooked should not too readily be drawn where the reasons are otherwise comprehensive and the issue has at least been identified at some point” (the Full Bench) The Full Bench cited it in finding that the Deputy President had regard to the matters Busways relied on, even though his reasoning did not set them out again.
Supported bargaining authorisation, application for judicial review
[2026] FCAFC 93
“Part 2-4 of the FW Act marks a significant departure away from the traditional path to collective agreement making since 1904.” (the Full Court, describing the Ulan decision) The Full Court relied on it to explain the bargaining streams, including supported bargaining, before reviewing a supported bargaining authorisation.
Single interest employer authorisation (s.248)
[2026] FWCFB 66
“Section 248(2) requires that the application must specify the employers that will be covered by the agreement, the employees who will be covered by the agreement” (the passage from Ulan relied on by the CEPU) The CEPU relied on it to argue that “the employees” means the employees who will be covered by the agreement, so competing applications must cover identical groups.

Key principles and takeaways

  • The Full Court in [2026] FCAFC 93 relied on Ulan for the view that Part 2-4 of the Fair Work Act departs from agreements arising from the joint will of employers and employees to bargain.
  • On review, as set out in [2026] FWC 2649, the court is concerned with whether the Commission attended to the task each statutory requirement set, as the statute required.
  • The Full Bench in [2026] FWCFB 196 cited it for the rule that an inference that a matter was overlooked is not readily drawn where the reasons are otherwise comprehensive and the issue has been identified.
  • In [2026] FWC 2649 the Commission treated whether a majority of employees “want to bargain” as a question on which the Commission must be satisfied.
  • The passage relied on in [2026] FWCFB 66 ties the Commission’s assessment of the preconditions to the employers and employees an application specifies.

What the Court decided

Three underground coal miners failed in the Federal Court on 5 September 2025 to quash a Fair Work Commission authorisation that bound them to bargain together over a small group of safety-critical staff. In the Full Court’s words, the authorisation meant that “against their will, these employers are required to bargain with a small cohort of their respective employees” and the employees’ union to make an enterprise agreement.

The decision is Ulan Coal Mines Pty Ltd v Association of Professional Engineers, Scientists and Managers, Australia [2025] FCAFC 127. Three judicial review applications were heard together. They were brought by Ulan Coal Mines Pty Ltd, Peabody Energy Australia Coal Pty Ltd and Whitehaven Coal Mining Ltd. The Association of Professional Engineers, Scientists and Managers, Australia (APESMA) had applied for the authorisation and was the respondent to each application. The Court stated its result at the outset: “For the reasons which follow, each of the applications must fail”. Its order read: “The applications be dismissed.”

At a glance

  • Parties: Ulan Coal Mines Pty Ltd, Peabody Energy Australia Coal Pty Ltd and Whitehaven Coal Mining Ltd (applicants); Association of Professional Engineers, Scientists and Managers, Australia (first respondent)
  • Citation: [2025] FCAFC 127, reviewing [2024] FWCFB 253; 334 IR 245
  • Section: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 249, including ss 249(1)(b)(iv), (v) and (vi), 249(1AA), 249(1B)(d), 249(3) and 249(3AB)
  • Bench: Justices Collier, Snaden and Raper; heard 17 and 18 March 2025, judgment 5 September 2025
  • Outcome: The applications were dismissed
  • Question decided: Whether the Commission’s decision to make the single interest employer authorisation “was vitiated by jurisdictional error”

Four mines, four safety roles, three employers bound

The Full Bench of the Commission made the authorisation under s 249 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) on 23 August 2024, in Association of Professional Engineers, Scientists and Managers, Australia v Great Southern Pty Ltd (t/as Delta Coal) [2024] FWCFB 253; 334 IR 245. All three employers run underground black coal mines in New South Wales. Peabody runs the Wambo Underground Coal Mine, Ulan runs the Ulan No 3 Underground Coal Mine and Whitehaven runs the Narrabri Coal Mine. Although the three were the applicants in the Federal Court, the Court refers to them as the “respondent employers”, as the Full Bench had.

Whitehaven, relying on Ulan’s submissions, submitted that the Full Bench had found Peabody to be the employer and the holder of a mining lease over its mine, but not the mine’s owner or operator. Whitehaven also submitted that the Full Bench had found its own operational role was confined to employing staff and contracting with suppliers and service providers, and that it ran no coal mines itself. Ulan submitted that the Full Bench found it owned, legally and beneficially, all the land and other assets relevant to its mine, and ran that mine.

APESMA also sought to include a fourth employer, Great Southern Energy Pty Ltd, trading as Delta Coal, which operates the Chain Valley Colliery. The Full Bench identified significant points of distinction and excluded Delta Coal from the authorisation. It found that Delta Coal’s “sole commercial purpose is not to make profits but to cover its costs of providing a reliable supply of thermal coal to Delta Electricity”, which was “comprehensibly different” to the purpose of the other three.

The application covered a small set of positions that each mine had to fill, being statutory roles or roles that secure compliance with the statutory requirements of mining operations: deputies, including crew supervisors; undermanagers; shift engineers, under a range of titles; and control room operators. The Full Bench found that, as at February 2024, 46 Ulan employees, of a workforce of approximately 250, and 43 Whitehaven employees, of a workforce of between 470 and 530, held these positions. It made no finding about how many Peabody staff held them. The Full Bench described the cohort as a “small component” of the New South Wales mining workforce of 25,336 full-time equivalent workers.

The Full Bench also made findings about each mine. Peabody’s Wambo mine runs a longwall operation with a “relatively short” remaining mine life, trucks its coal to a treatment plant before rail to Newcastle, sells mainly into Asia, and has difficulty attracting and retaining staff. Ulan runs a longwall operation, railing coal to Newcastle on a 22.7 hour round trip, and encourages staff to live locally rather than drive in and drive out. Whitehaven’s Narrabri longwall mine processes coal on site and rails it to Newcastle on a 27 hour round trip, with a mixed local, drive in and fly in workforce and varied rosters. Delta Coal, by contrast, is a bord and pillar mine on the Central Coast supplying a nearby power station, with a local workforce and a “significant recruitment advantage”.

A provision that sits “somewhat uncomfortably”

The Court said the dispute arose in part from the single interest employer authorisation provisions in Pt 2-4 and “how they sit (somewhat uncomfortably) within the rest of the legislative scheme”. It described them as “a significant departure away from industrial laws since 1904”, which had recognised collective bargaining arising “from the joint will of employers and employees (and their representatives) at the enterprise level”.

The Court traced that history. Registration of collective agreements was possible under the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth), but the parties left it unused. Enterprise agreement-making began with the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) and was refined from 1992, “always on the basis that such agreements would be entered voluntarily at the single-enterprise level.”

The current provisions were enacted by the Fair Work Legislation Amendment (Secure Jobs, Better Pay) Act 2022 (Cth). Before that, a single interest authorisation was available only where the employers themselves applied and either operated under the same franchise or had a Ministerial declaration. The 2022 amendments let a bargaining representative apply for an authorisation over employers who do not consent. The Court observed that such an authorisation “can be, in effect, imposed upon employers by the Commission, and impede their ability to choose who they bargain with”.

Where the employers do not consent, s 249(1B) requires, among other things, that each employer employed at least 20 employees when the application was made and that a majority of the employees to be covered want to bargain. Because the employers were not franchisees, the Commission also had to be satisfied of common interests and the public interest under s 249(3) and of reasonable comparability under s 249(1)(b)(vi).

Two presumptions shaped the case. Under ss 249(1AA) and 249(3AB), where a bargaining representative made the application and an employer “employed 50 employees or more at the time that the application was made”, the requirements of s 249(3) are presumed met, and the employer’s operations and business activities are presumed reasonably comparable, “unless the contrary is proved”. The Court said these presumptions applied in this case, and that the employers bore “the onus of disproving the presumption”.

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), s 249(3) and (3AB)

(3) The requirements of this subsection are met if: (a) the employers have clearly identifiable common interests; and (b) it is not contrary to the public interest to make the authorisation. … (3AB) If: (a) the application for the authorisation was made by a bargaining representative under paragraph 248(1)(b); and (b) an employer that will be covered by the agreement employed 50 employees or more at the time that the application was made; it is presumed that the requirements of subsection (3) are met in relation to that employer, unless the contrary is proved.

Not a review of the merits

The Court said its task was not to consider “the merits of the underlying dispute nor social policy as to whether different employers should be forced to bargain”, but whether the Commission’s decision “was vitiated by jurisdictional error”. It applied established restraints: reasons are read as a whole “without the use of a fine appellate tooth comb” (Wu Shan Liang); an inference that an issue was not considered should not readily be drawn where reasons are comprehensive and the issue was identified (Applicant WAEE); the Court must not “fill in gaps in the path of reasoning” (LPDT); and weight is for the decision-maker (Peko-Wallsend). It also said what was required was “a substantive rather than form-driven review”.

Because the applicants’ grounds were imprecise and overlapping, the Court asked them to agree a list of issues. They identified five, tied to the Full Bench’s “major issues in dispute”: common interests (Peabody Ground 1, Whitehaven Grounds 1 to 8, Ulan Ground 3); Peabody’s procedural fairness complaint (Peabody Ground 2); the public interest (Peabody Ground 3, Whitehaven Ground 12, Ulan Ground 5); reasonable comparability (Peabody Ground 4, Whitehaven Grounds 9 and 10, Ulan Ground 4); and majority support (Ulan Grounds 1 and 2, Whitehaven Ground 11).

Common interests: the level of analysis was for the Commission

The Court said the Full Bench “identified correctly the test”: whether the employers have “joint, shared, related or like characteristics, qualities, undertakings or concerns that will impact or influence them in relation to bargaining for an enterprise agreement that will cover the SIEA employees.” It also endorsed the Full Bench’s construction: for common interests to be “clearly identifiable”, they must be “plainly discernible or recognisable” but need not be self-evident, and the matters listed in s 249(3A) may inform the question, but more must be shown than that the employers share them.

Peabody argued

that s 249(3)(a) requires “clear homogeneity” of the employers’ interests relevant to bargaining, and that the Full Bench “climbed over” real differences by constructing common interests at an overly general level, “creating artificial commonality”. Whitehaven said the relevant commonality was in wages, hours, rosters, incentives and bonuses, pointing to its unchallenged evidence of different conditions at Narrabri. Ulan stressed a commercial and industrial conflict between it and Peabody.

APESMA submitted

that the Commission was entitled to weigh the narrow scope of the authorisation, covering specialised staff each mine was required by legislation to employ, and that this bore on how far differences could displace the presumption.

The Full Court held

“we reject the respondent employers’ claim that the Full Bench ultimately misapprehended the nature of the inquiry”, that being the claim that the Full Bench cast employer interests “at a thematic level that was too general and abstract”.

The Court rejected the argument that the Full Bench had pitched its analysis too high. “The legislation calls for the specialist tribunal to make an evaluation on a spectrum”, it said. The Commission’s reasons “carefully, and repeatedly, wrestle with the spectrum of analysis, correctly not adopting any fixed position”. The Full Bench had made detailed findings on each mine’s circumstances, and its summary conclusions had to be read with them.

Scope was central. The Court said that where an application concerns “a small cohort of employees that, by statutory command, the employer is required to employ”, that will bear on whether differences such as mine life, retention and profitability displace the presumption. The Full Bench had found the roles are required under the Work Health and Safety (Mines and Petroleum Sites) Regulation 2022 (NSW) and that the employers “cannot operate their respective mines without such personnel”. From that, it identified a common concern in attracting and retaining these staff, pursued by different means. The Court said it was open to treat that concern as the interest, and the different terms and conditions as means of meeting it.

The Court also said generalised evidence of the economic impact of bargaining disruption “may be less persuasive” given the small number of employees involved compared with the whole workforce. On Delta Coal’s different commercial purpose, the Court said Ulan’s complaint of inconsistent treatment “impermissibly attacks the merits of the decision.” On geography, the Court found the Full Bench “did not ‘climb over’ the evidence, but rather was not persuaded by it”.

Peabody’s conflict submission was considered

Peabody pointed to Glencore Group, the corporate group that includes Ulan, which has substantial interests in two other Hunter Valley mines competing directly with Wambo. It argued Glencore could gain commercially if bargaining weakened Wambo. Peabody and Ulan said the Full Bench did not deal with this in its consideration and conclusion on common interests.

The Court rejected that contention. Applying Qube Logistics (Rail) Pty Ltd v Australian Rail, Tram and Bus Industry Union [2025] FCAFC 73, a decision-maker must “read, identify, understand and evaluate” a submission. The Full Bench had referred to this submission and evidence twice, and under Applicant WAEE an inference of non-consideration should not readily be drawn. The Court noted it “was not furnished with the submissions of the parties below”. It was open to the Commission to find that a commercial conflict “was not dispositive one way or another” in an authorisation concerning statutorily mandated staff.

Public interest: the employers had to show a consequence

The employers argued the Full Bench construed the public interest too narrowly when it said their concerns about inefficient bargaining and lost flexibility “pertain to the Respondent Employers’ interests rather than matters which affect the public as a whole.”

The Court said “in the public interest” imports “a discretionary value judgment” (O’Sullivan v Farrer). It added: “There is often no clear bright line between matters that affect the public as opposed to private interests.” It said it was unclear whether the Full Bench adopted the distinction drawn in Re Kellogg Brown, and “not clear why the Full Bench relied upon” the Explanatory Memorandum to the first version of the Bill, given its very different form and later amendments. The Revised Explanatory Memorandum pointed to the objects in ss 3 and 171.

That did not lead to error. Following Central Goldfields Shire Council v Australian Municipal, Administrative, Clerical and Services Union [2025] FCAFC 59, where s 249(3AB) applies the employer must identify a consequence “inimical to the public interest”. The Court said “it was for the employer respondents to prove why the public interest would not be served”, and that “generalised submissions” about efficient enterprise-level bargaining were not enough. It rejected the argument that the Act’s objects refer only to single-employer bargaining, and dismissed as a “hollow submission” the claim that the Commission failed to consider all relevant circumstances. It noted it had no copy of the submissions below and only a heavily redacted transcript.

Reasonable comparability: a different test from common interests

The Court said the reasonable comparability test “is clearly a different one from that concerning common interest”. Common interests allow a broader enquiry, including at corporate group level. Comparability is targeted at the employing entities’ “operations” (how they operate) and “business activities” (what they do). Properly construed, “reasonably comparable” means both “are generally equivalent, alike or similar, such that joint bargaining will be facilitated.”

Whitehaven, Peabody and Ulan argued the Full Bench’s “key similarities” were too general. Whitehaven also challenged the findings that each role is either required by mining safety legislation or carries out required functions, and that each mine faces geological stressors. The Court said this reasoning “cannot be read in isolation” from the detailed findings before it. The Full Bench found Peabody, Ulan and Whitehaven share large-scale, highly automated longwall operations in remote locations, railing coal to Newcastle for export, while Delta Coal was a small-scale, labour-intensive operation for local supply.

Peabody argued the Commission set “too high a bar” by not treating its end of mine life circumstances, including a smaller longwall, lower yield and older equipment, as sufficient. The Court said the Full Bench accepted those differences and gave them specific consideration, and it was open to conclude they did not rebut the presumption.

Majority support and APESMA’s campaign

Ulan and Whitehaven did not dispute that most of the relevant employees had voted to bargain. They argued that “want to bargain” in s 249(1B)(d) means a wish that is genuine or informed and not induced by misrepresentation. APESMA argued that Parliament had used such terms elsewhere in the Act, in s 186(2)(a), and would have used them here had it intended them to apply.

  • Apr to Nov 2023 APESMA holds formal meetings with the relevant employees.
  • 18 Nov 2023 Two resolutions carried at a meeting.
  • 24 Nov 2023 Vero Voting opens the ballot.
  • 23 Aug 2024 Full Bench makes the authorisation.
  • 17 and 18 Mar 2025 Full Court hearing.
  • 5 Sep 2025 Applications dismissed.

Between April and November 2023, APESMA held formal meetings with the employees and distributed flyers and FAQs, and two resolutions were carried at a meeting on 18 November 2023. External provider Vero Voting opened voting on 24 November 2023, and voters were given a log of claims for a “New South Wales Multi-Employer Agreement”.

The Court was critical of the campaign. APESMA communicated with employees “without the knowledge of the respondent employers, for many months”, which the scheme allows, so its communications “went unchecked and without any contradictor”. The Court said the communications “were less than the standard one would expect and contained broad claims (as to the benefits of the proposed authorisation) which were either inaccurate or capable of being misleading.” It noted the penal provision on false or misleading representations about workplace rights in s 345.

It added that “it is not for a review Court to remedy actual or perceived unfairness”. The Full Bench declined to imply “genuine” or “informed” into s 249(1B)(d), but considered whether the ballot was “falsely derived”, including through material misrepresentation. The Court did not accept that the Commission misconstrued the provision. It said descriptors such as “genuine” or “informed” “may or may not be helpful”, and the question is whether the majority “want to bargain”.

The Full Bench had dealt with the allegations in detail, including APESMA’s “bald assertions that common law contracts are not enforceable”, weighed against the employees being senior staff, some with bargaining experience. The Court rejected the legal unreasonableness claim, finding the Commission’s conclusions “rested upon evident and intelligible foundations”.

On costs, the Court said s 570 of the Fair Work Act “likely prohibits the making of any order as to costs”, leaving the parties at liberty to advise if there was reason to depart from that position.

Source: [2025] FCAFC 127

General information only. OnNotice reports developments in Australian industrial relations, human resources and workplace law. This article is for education purposes only and is not intended to form professional advice. Always confirm against the primary source and seek specific advice relating to your circumstances.

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