Why is Helensburgh Coal Pty Ltd v Bartley relevant to workplace disputes in Australia?
Helensburgh Coal Pty Ltd v Bartley [2025] HCA 29 is the High Court’s reading of the genuine redundancy test in s 389 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). Under s 389(1)(a), whether a job is no longer required is a factual question about the employer’s own decision, with no reasonableness inquiry. Under s 389(2), whether redeployment was reasonable is not confined to vacant positions: it can extend to changes in how the employer uses its workforce.
The decisions OnNotice has reported cite it in unfair dismissal claims arising from redundancy and in a general protections dismissal claim lodged out of time. Full Benches also rely on it for how appeals under s 604 are decided, and the Federal Court relies on it for what counts as jurisdictional error by the Commission.
How the Commission and the courts use it
| Type of matter | What the decision said | What it means |
|---|---|---|
| Unfair dismissal (s.394) [2026] FWC 3590 |
“There is no reasonableness inquiry in s 389(1).” (the High Court, as quoted by the Commission in [2026] FWC 3590) | The Commission used the case to treat the question of whether the worker’s job was no longer required as a factual inquiry into the employer’s decision, and found that the job was no longer required. |
| Unfair dismissal (s.394), redundancy [2026] FWC 3697 |
“It is the employer’s decision to no longer require a person’s job to be performed by anyone.” (Gageler CJ, Gordon and Beech-Jones JJ, as quoted by the Commission in [2026] FWC 3697) | The Commission relied on the case to frame the test of whether a job was no longer required in a restructure that it ruled a genuine redundancy. |
| Unfair dismissal (s.394), redundancy [2026] FWC 3801 |
“does not, by its ordinary meaning, exclude or prohibit some change to how an employer uses its workforce to operate its enterprise that facilitates redeployment” (the High Court majority, as quoted by the Commission in [2026] FWC 3801) | The Commission applied the wider meaning of redeployment, then found redeployment was not a viable option because the reorganisation was limited in scope and the employer was under a hiring freeze. |
| General protections, dismissal (s.365) [2026] FWC 3807 |
“often that includes redistributing the duties previously performed within a redundant position to other employees or to third party contractors” (the Commission, citing Steward J) | The Commission cited the case on an employer’s prerogative to reallocate duties, and found that the redistribution of duties did not weigh towards exceptional circumstances for a late claim. |
| Appeal (s.604), labour hire [2026] FWCFB 233 |
“The powers of the Full Bench on appeal are only able to be exercised if error is found in the first instance decision.” (the Full Bench) | The Full Bench cited the case for the rule that an appeal under s 604 is a rehearing in which error must be shown before the appeal powers are engaged. |
| Judicial review of a Commission decision [2026] FCA 1354 |
“Jurisdictional error may occur if the Commission misconceived its role, misunderstood the nature of its jurisdiction, misconceived its duty, failed to apply itself to the question required of it, or misunderstood the nature of the opinion which it was required to form” (the Federal Court) | The Federal Court relied on the case to describe the kinds of error that take the Commission outside its jurisdiction, as distinct from errors on the merits. |
Key principles and takeaways
- Decisions applying the case treat s 389(1)(a) as a factual inquiry into a decision made by the employer and no one else, and the High Court said in the passage quoted in [2026] FWC 3590 that the decision “need not have been reasonable.”
- The Commission reads the test as concerned with whether the worker’s job, in the sense of the work performed, was no longer required, not whether a job title survived.
- On redeployment under s 389(2), the Commission in [2026] FWC 3801 applied the High Court’s view that reasonable redeployment is not limited to a vacant position, while still finding on the facts that redeployment was not viable.
- The Commission in [2026] FWC 3807, citing Steward J, treated redistributing a redundant position’s duties to other employees or contractors as within the employer’s prerogative.
- Full Benches cite the case for the rule that an appeal under s 604 is by way of rehearing in which error must be found, and the Federal Court cites it for the scope of jurisdictional error by the Commission.
What the Court decided
A 2020 restructure at the Metropolitan Coal Mine cut 90 employees, 47 of them by forced redundancy, while contractors supplied by two companies continued to perform work at the site. On 24 June 2020, 22 of Helensburgh Coal’s employees, the first to twenty-second respondents to the appeal, were dismissed as a result of changes in the operational requirements of its enterprise. On 6 August 2025 the High Court dismissed the mine operator’s appeal in Helensburgh Coal Pty Ltd v Bartley [2025] HCA 29, holding that the joint reasons put it this way: “the FWC was permitted by s 389(2) to inquire into whether Helensburgh could have made changes to how it uses its workforce to operate its enterprise”.
Demand for the coking coal produced at the Mine fell sharply during the COVID-19 pandemic. In May 2020 Helensburgh Coal Pty Ltd told employees it had resolved to restructure operations at the Mine, cutting crew numbers and the days worked each week, so that fewer workers were needed. Nexus Mining Pty Ltd and Mentser Pty Ltd had been engaged in 2018 and 2019 respectively to supply services at the Mine. During consultations, workforce representatives asked the company to soften the effect on employees by using those contractors less. The company accepted some insourcing (bringing contracted work back in-house for its own employees) but would not end the Nexus and Mentser arrangements. Contractor numbers fell by approximately 40 per cent. The first to twenty-second respondents were dismissed on 24 June 2020 and applied to the Commission for unfair dismissal remedies under s 394 on or about 10 July 2020.
At a glance
- Parties: Helensburgh Coal Pty Ltd (appellant); Neil Bartley and others named in the schedule (respondents), the twenty-third respondent being the Fair Work Commission, which filed a submitting appearance
- Citation: [2025] HCA 29, on appeal from the Full Court of the Federal Court in Helensburgh Coal Pty Ltd v Bartley (2024) 302 FCR 589
- Court: Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward and Beech-Jones JJ; heard 6 March 2025, judgment 6 August 2025
- Sections: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 385(d), 389, 391, 396, 604
- Outcome: Appeal dismissed
- Question decided: the scope of the inquiry mandated by s 389(2) of the Fair Work Act: in deciding whether it would have been reasonable in all the circumstances for a person to be redeployed within the employer’s enterprise, can the Fair Work Commission consider whether the employer could have made changes to how it uses its workforce to operate its enterprise?
The provision the case turns on
Section 385 sets out four elements that must each be satisfied before a person has been unfairly dismissed, one of which is that the dismissal was not a case of “genuine redundancy”. Before the merits of an application can be considered, s 396 requires the Commission to determine, among other matters, “whether the dismissal was a case of genuine redundancy”. Helensburgh objected to the applications on that basis.
[a] person’s dismissal was not a case of genuine redundancy if it would have been reasonable in all the circumstances for the person to be redeployed within … the employer’s enterprise
“Enterprise” is defined in s 12 to mean “a business, activity, project or undertaking”. The Act does not define what it means for a person to be redeployed.
How it got here
The matter produced four Commission decisions. A Commissioner twice held that the terminations were not cases of genuine redundancy, and the Full Bench quashed the first decision and remitted it before dismissing the second appeal. Helensburgh then applied to the Full Court of the Federal Court for certiorari quashing all four decisions and prohibition restraining the Commission from dealing further with the applications, relief that was open only if the decisions were affected by jurisdictional error (an error going to the nature of the decision-maker’s authority rather than an error made within it). Katzmann and Snaden JJ, Raper J agreeing, refused relief.
- 24 Jun 2020 The Employees are dismissed.
- 10 Jul 2020 Unfair dismissal applications filed under s 394.
- 2020 to 2022 Four Fair Work Commission decisions, including two Full Bench appeals.
- 2024 Full Court of the Federal Court dismisses the judicial review application.
- 6 Mar 2025 High Court hears the appeal.
- 6 Aug 2025 Appeal dismissed.
B W Walker SC with A M Pomerenke KC and P M Zielinski appeared for Helensburgh, instructed by MinterEllison. J T Gleeson SC with P A Boncardo appeared for the first to twenty-second respondents, instructed by the Mining and Energy Union.
What each side put
that s 389(2), properly construed, does not let the Commission ask whether an employer could have altered its enterprise so as to create or free up a position for an employee who would otherwise be redundant, and that the “enterprise” in s 389(2) “is the actual enterprise of the employer at the date of dismissal, and not some other enterprise conceived of in the mind of the FWC”.
before the Commission that the dismissals were not genuine redundancies because the company should have moved them into work that the contractors were then carrying out.
that “the FWC was permitted by s 389(2) to inquire into whether Helensburgh could have made changes to how it uses its workforce to operate its enterprise”. Ground 1 was rejected.
Why a vacant position is not required
The joint reasons worked through each element of s 389(2). On the word “redeployed”, their Honours said it “does not require there to be a vacant position”, and that the ordinary meaning of “redeploy”, given as “to rearrange, reorganise, or transfer”, “envisages some reorganisation or rearrangement”. Because s 389(2), unlike s 389(1), makes no mention of a “job”, the text does not presuppose that a position is already there to be filled. What matters instead is whether the enterprise had work, or demand for work, that the otherwise redundant employee could have performed.
The words “would have been” direct the Commission to a hypothetical, with the past tense fixing attention on the situation at the time of the dismissal. Reasonableness is an objective question, not assessed only from the employer’s point of view or only from the employee’s. The phrase “all the circumstances” is “unmistakably broad” and points against binding rules applying irrespective of the circumstances of each case.
Their Honours listed what may fall within “all the circumstances”: the employee’s skill set, experience, training and competencies, and attributes of the enterprise concerning its workforce, including policies and appetite for risk, plans, processes, procedures, business choices such as a decision to persist with using contractors, decisions about whether the enterprise has a blended workforce, contract terms such as whether contractors are on daily work orders or long-term fixed commitments, practical concerns such as further training, and anticipated changes such as a retirement or a contract expiring. Those circumstances, the joint reasons said, are “not directed at the size, scope or nature of the enterprise, which are fixed at the date of dismissal”.
The limit the joint reasons drew came from the definition of “enterprise” in s 12. The Commission cannot change the nature of the business, activity, project or undertaking. But the nature of the enterprise “is not defined by reference to how the employer uses its workforce to operate its enterprise, or why it does so in that manner”.
Reading s 389(2) that way, the joint reasons said, furthers the object in s 381(1)(a) of balancing the needs of business and the needs of employees. As their Honours put it, “The language of s 389 does not prohibit asking whether an employer could have made changes to how it uses its workforce to operate its enterprise so as to create or make available a position for a person who would otherwise have been redundant.” Helensburgh’s proposed distinction between “organic” and “inorganic” change was not apparent from the text. On remedies, their Honours noted that s 391(1)(b) allows an order appointing a dismissed person to another position, and that it has been held an employer may create a new position for the purpose of complying.
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Fair Work Bill 2008, relied on by Helensburgh for its example of there being “no positions available for which the employee has suitable qualifications or experience”, was described as “a high-level and undetailed example” that says nothing about the meaning of the employer’s enterprise, and its illustrative restaurant scenario as “a short and fact-deficient example”. On the legislative history, the joint reasons noted that after the Work Choices amendments redeployment opportunities were generally treated as irrelevant to “genuine operational reasons”, and that s 389 expressly requires the Commission to consider redeployment opportunities: “There has therefore been a significant rebalance in favour of employees since the enactment of the FW Act.”
The employer’s own decision under s 389(1) is not reviewable
Both the joint reasons and Steward J drew a sharp line between the two subsections. Section 389(1)(a) turns on a decision in fact made by the employer to no longer require a person’s job to be performed by anyone, looking to the nature of the work rather than the job title, and no reasonableness inquiry arises under s 389(1). Steward J said that decision “cannot be set aside or second-guessed”, that an employer is at liberty to determine what changes in operational requirements might be or if they are needed, and that the capacity to render a position redundant has been likened to an employer’s “prerogative”.
Steward J held that the “employer’s enterprise” in s 389(2) is the actual enterprise as at the date of dismissal, including its policies, processes, procedures, strategies and business choices, any plans for the future, the composition of its actual labour force, and “its policies and practices in relation to the use of labour, including as to whether to use permanent employees, independent contractors, casual labour, or contractors”. The Commission must take the enterprise as it finds it.
He also recorded that at the date of dismissal there was no vacant role within the enterprise to which any of the Employees might be redeployed, nor was it foreseeable that such a vacancy might arise, and that eight Mentser employees and around 90 Nexus employees worked at the Mine. Removing the eight Mentser workers would have led almost inevitably to their dismissal, and it was accepted that the vast majority of the Nexus workers who were replaced would also have been dismissed. On that footing he said: “Redeployment of a person at the expense of another person’s position would be a very grave step to take and would be unlikely to be a reasonable outcome.” Cases requiring an inquiry into whether an enterprise could reasonably have been altered to create new jobs, he said, are likely to be rare, echoing Raper J’s observation in the Full Court that it would be “a rare case indeed”.
Edelman J on what was imminently available
Edelman J agreed that “all the circumstances” permits a wide range of considerations but that the Commission has no authority to consider a redeployment involving any significant change to the essential or important facets of the enterprise as it stood at the date of dismissal. On the facts, he found there were jobs imminently available to which the former employees could have been redeployed: the contractors were supplied on an “as needs” basis to do work that was ongoing and sustaining, Helensburgh was under no continuing obligation to request them, the Nexus contract was due to expire shortly after the dismissals, and there was no evidence of any policy or practice that the work should be done only by contractors. He recorded that the unallocated work was performed after the restructure by around 60 workers supplied by the two contractor companies, at least 50 of them by Nexus, and that the Full Bench found “little evidence of substance” of the asserted cost difference between using employees and contract labour.
The review-standard ground was left undecided by the joint reasons
Helensburgh’s second ground was that the Full Bench should have applied a correctness standard rather than the standard in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499. The joint reasons said it was unnecessary to decide, because even if the correctness standard were the appropriate one, applying the wrong standard would have been an error within jurisdiction and not a jurisdictional error. The Full Bench properly understood that its role on appeal was to identify error, and “a failure to apply the correct standard of appellate review on the part of the Full Bench would not amount to a misunderstanding of its role”. Steward J agreed with and adopted those reasons on ground 2.
Edelman J addressed the question directly, setting out the factors bearing on the standard Parliament intended, including the public interest threshold for permission to appeal under s 604(2), the significant error of fact requirement in s 400(2), the Commission’s status as a specialist tribunal that must take into account “equity, good conscience and the merits of the matter” under s 578(b), the open-textured criteria in ss 385(d) and 389(2), and the Explanatory Memorandum’s statement that s 604 is “intended to maintain the existing jurisprudence in relation to AIRC appeals”. He concluded that accepting Helensburgh’s submission “would require the rejection of the plain intention of the Commonwealth Parliament”.
What the appeal did not decide
The joint reasons were explicit that resolving the construction question “does not require this Court to determine whether the FWC’s conclusion about the reasonableness of redeployment was correct”, and that because s 396 isolates genuine redundancy as a separate preliminary question, “[t]his appeal will not resolve the ultimate question of whether the Employees were unfairly dismissed”. Steward J said the same, noting the appellant did not otherwise challenge the Commission’s conclusion. Whether the former employees were unfairly dismissed therefore remains to be determined, and what the decision settles is the scope of the s 389(2) inquiry itself: the Commission may ask what an employer could have done with its workforce, while the size, scope and nature of the enterprise are taken as they stood on the day of the dismissal.
Source: [2025] HCA 29
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