A former Bureau of Meteorology employee who asked the Federal Court to reopen an interlocutory injunction application he had already lost has been ordered to pay the Commonwealth’s costs of the attempt. Justice Snaden delivered judgment on 12 August 2026 in the Court’s Fair Work Division, Victoria Registry: [2026] FCA 1100.
The applicant, who appeared in person, had sought interim injunctive relief relating to his former employment by the Bureau. That application was dismissed on 14 May 2026 ([2026] FCA 594), principally because the Court had not been satisfied that a prima facie case for injunctive relief was made out. Justice Snaden had accepted that the balance of convenience slightly favoured relief, but had also raised concerns about how long the applicant had taken to press the claim.
By an interlocutory application dated 11 June 2026, the applicant sought orders that the determined application “be reopened for limited reconsideration”. A registrar dismissed that application on 15 June 2026 during a case management hearing, telling the applicant that the injunction application had “been heard and determined” and that it was “not open to [him] to seek to re-open that hearing”. The registrar accepted there might be “very limited circumstances” in which the Court would reopen an interlocutory decision, but found the circumstances did not fall into that category, and said any challenge to the judgment would have to be brought by way of appeal.
On 30 June 2026 the applicant applied under s 35A(5) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) for review by a judge of the registrar’s decision. The review was heard on 15 July 2026 on an urgent basis at the applicant’s request.
that exceptional circumstances existed such that the orders made on the injunction application should be set aside or varied under r 39.05(c) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). He pointed to ill health, limits on his participation connected to disability, and the difficulties of running the case without a lawyer, which he said meant the application had been “determined without [his] having had a practical and procedurally fair opportunity to place [his] case before the [c]ourt”. His submission continued: “[a]t its heart, this application concerns access to justice”. He also raised further arguments on the prima facie case, fresh evidence about his deteriorating health and rehabilitative prospects, and evidence said to put the delay in seeking interim reinstatement in context.
an order that the applicant pay its costs of and pertaining to both the reopening application and the review application, which it estimated at approximately $22,700.00.
that the reopening application was misconceived and that the registrar had been right to dismiss it. Arguments conceived later, with the benefit of time, were “not new material” and did not show exceptional circumstances, and the fresh evidence was not such as to reflect the existence of a prima facie case for interlocutory injunctive relief. The reopening application was, he held, “little more than a mechanism by which to prosecute a second claim to the same injunctive relief that he failed to secure the first time around”, and was “meritless and self-indulgent”.
On the procedural fairness complaint, Justice Snaden found the applicant had been given a proper chance to put the case he wished to put, had not asked for any more time than he received, and had argued the matter coherently at a hearing listed urgently at his own request.
Justice Snaden said: “Procedural fairness inheres in affording an opportunity to mount the case that one wishes to mount.”
Any costs order had to clear the hurdle in s 570(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), which required the Court to be satisfied that the applications had been pursued vexatiously or without reasonable cause, or had otherwise unreasonably caused the Bureau to incur costs it ought not to have incurred. Justice Snaden was satisfied the hurdle was cleared: the reopening application “was foredoomed to failure and ought never to have been pursued”, the review application was “equally futile”, and it was unreasonable to require the Bureau to spend time and money defending a claim it had already defended successfully. Neither the applicant’s self-representation nor his personal circumstances shielded him from that consequence.
The Court did not fix an amount. Of the Bureau’s estimate of approximately $22,700.00, Justice Snaden said it “strikes as unlikely but I might be wrong about that”, and ordered that costs be assessed in default of agreement in accordance with the Court’s costs practice note (gpn-costs).
The judgment restates two points for parties in the Fair Work Division. First, r 39.05(c) “certainly is not an alternative to the appellate procedure in respect of interlocutory judgments”, as Justice Snaden noted in citing Dudzinski v Centrelink [2003] FCA 308, and the ordinary rule, drawn from Brimaud v Honeysett Instant Print Pty Ltd, is that such an application “must be founded on a material change of circumstances since the original application was heard, or the discovery of new material which could not reasonably have been put before the court on the hearing of the original application”. Second, the costs protection in s 570 did not immunise a self-represented applicant whose repeat application put the respondent to the expense of defending the same claim twice.
Source: [2026] FCA 1100
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