Why is Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union v ALS Industrial Australia Pty Ltd relevant to workplace disputes in Australia?
The Full Court’s decision is cited for the nature of arbitration the parties agree to in their agreement. In the decisions OnNotice has reported, the Commission’s power to arbitrate such a dispute is described as being in the nature of private arbitration, available because the parties agreed to it. That agreed arbitration is read as including an appeal to a Full Bench, with the requirement to seek permission to appeal, and the appeal is treated as part of the same private arbitration.
The case appears in Full Bench appeals, in a regulated labour hire dispute and in a dispute resolution matter before the Commission.
How the Commission uses it
| Type of matter | What the decision said | What it means |
|---|---|---|
| Appeal (s.604) [2026] FWCFB 269 |
The Full Bench said: “A simple reference to a dispute being referred to the Commission for arbitration is to be understood to include the appellate process envisaged by s 604, including the requirement to seek permission to appeal” | The Full Bench relied on the case to treat the agreement’s arbitration clause as covering an appeal, so Visy needed permission to appeal. |
| Appeal (s.604) [2026] FWCFB 249 |
The Full Bench said: “Where the Full Bench determines an appeal from a decision made in the course of dealing with a dispute referred to the Commission for arbitration by the agreement of the parties, the appeal itself forms part of a process of private arbitration” | The Full Bench cited the case for the proposition that an appeal from an agreed arbitration is itself part of the private arbitration, before considering how far the appeal process extends. |
| Regulated labour hire dispute (s.306P) [2026] FWCFB 102 |
The Full Bench said: “The Commission is able to determine disputed questions concerning the legal rights and liabilities of the parties because the parties have agreed for it to do so” | The Full Bench used the case to describe consent based arbitration of agreement disputes and contrasted it with regulated labour hire arbitration, where consent is not a precondition. |
| Dispute resolution (s.739) [2026] FWC 3429 |
The decision records: “The Respondent cited AMWU v ALS Industrial Australia Pty Ltd & Anor. (2015) 235 FCR 305 at [102], [123] and [134].” | The respondent relied on the case in its submissions in a dispute resolution matter, as the decision’s footnotes record. |
Key principles and takeaways
- The Full Bench in [2026] FWCFB 102 described the Commission’s power to arbitrate an agreement dispute as being in the nature of private arbitration, resting on the parties’ agreement.
- The Full Bench in [2026] FWCFB 269 read a simple reference to arbitration by the Commission as including the appellate process and the requirement to seek permission to appeal.
- The Full Bench in [2026] FWCFB 249 treated an appeal from an agreed arbitration as itself forming part of a process of private arbitration.
- The Full Bench in [2026] FWCFB 102 distinguished consent based arbitration from regulated labour hire arbitration, where agreement to arbitration matters only for an order to apply to work performed before the order is made.
What the Court decided
For about 15 years, technicians testing plant at Alcoa’s three Western Australian alumina refineries were paid travel time as if their working day began at a Perth metropolitan office of the employer, most recently in Canning Vale, a place some of them rarely or never visited. A Full Bench of the Fair Work Commission ruled that the refinery sites themselves could be each employee’s “Company base” under the enterprise agreement. The Full Court of the Federal Court dismissed the union’s application for writs of certiorari and mandamus against that ruling in Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union v ALS Industrial Australia Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 123.
Along the way, the Court addressed whether a Full Bench hearing an appeal under s 604 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), from an arbitration the parties had agreed to in their enterprise agreement, is still acting as a private arbitrator. It concluded that the agreed arbitration included the appeal, and said it was inclined to the view that the resulting award should generally not be open to review by the constitutional writs.
At a glance
- Parties: Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union, known as the Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union (applicant); ALS Industrial Australia Pty Ltd (first respondent); Fair Work Commission (second respondent, did not appear)
- Citation: [2015] FCAFC 123
- Court: Full Court of the Federal Court, Fair Work Division (Justices Dowsett, Tracey and Katzmann)
- Section: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 577, 604, 739; cll 15 and 37 of the ALS Industrial Australia (WA) Enterprise Agreement 2012
- Outcome: Application dismissed; no costs order unless an application is made within 14 days
- Question decided: Whether the constitutional writs will go to the Fair Work Commission’s Full Bench on an appeal under s 604 from an arbitration conducted under an enterprise agreement, and whether jurisdictional error or error of law on the face of the record was shown in its construction of “employee’s Company base”
A travel clause worth $30,000 a year or more to some workers, ALS said
ALS supplies non-destructive testing services to Alcoa’s alumina refineries at Kwinana, Pinjarra and Wagerup. The testing is usually carried out on Alcoa’s own plant and equipment, at the refinery. Deputy President McCarthy noted that staff under the agreement had been working at the Alcoa refineries for around 15 years, and that ALS put the number permanently stationed at one of the three refineries at about 48.
ALS and the earlier employers had always calculated travel payments using a Perth metropolitan office as the Company base: Booragoon, Welshpool or one of two Canning Vale locations. “At no time have any of the Alcoa sites been used as the employees’ Company base for the purpose of calculating travel payments,” the Deputy President recorded. ALS argued that it had applied the clause that way as a matter of discretion, not obligation.
Clause 15 of the ALS Industrial Australia (WA) Enterprise Agreement 2012 pays agreed travel time, up to 1.5 hours each way, where an employee is required to attend a location other than “the employee’s Company base”, with excess travel paid at overtime rates outside ordinary hours. Approved by the Commission on 10 July 2013, the agreement commenced a week later and nominally expires on 30 November 2016. Two earlier agreements, from 2006 and 2009, contained much the same terms. At issue was the final sentence of cl 15.5.
For the purpose of this clause, an employee’s Company base as at the day this Agreement is approved by FWC will be the employee’s Company base already nominated by the Company. From time to time, the Company may nominate an alternate Company base.
Clause 37, the dispute settlement procedure, provides at Stage 4 that an unresolved dispute about the application of the agreement “may be determined by FWC exercising its arbitration powers”. As the Court noted, cl 37 “makes no mention of appeals”.
The travel clause was contested in bargaining. On 18 January 2013 ALS applied to the Commission to resolve that aspect of the negotiations. Its application said the “actual company bases for approximately half of the Applicant’s workforce are on clients’ sites at Kwinana, Pinjarra and Wagerup”, but that their base for the clause was Canning Vale. ALS said it had elected not to use cl 15.5 to change employees to their actual base because this “would result in the loss of significant amounts of overtime ($30,000 p.a. or more for some employees)”. It proposed instead to “grandfather” current arrangements for existing employees and introduce new arrangements for new starters.
In September 2013, after the agreement was approved with the clause left as it was, ALS announced that it would change the way travel was paid and offer other payments to soften the effect on the staff concerned. The union’s application to the Commission described an ALS letter of 28 October 2013 announcing changes from 2 December 2013, including a site allowance of $3.20 for each hour worked at a strategic site. The union referred the dispute on 20 November 2013 under the agreement’s dispute procedure and s 739 of the Act.
- 18 Jan 2013 ALS applies to the Commission during bargaining over the travel clause.
- 10 Jul 2013 Commission approves the 2012 Agreement.
- Sep 2013 ALS gives notice it will change how travel payments are made.
- 20 Nov 2013 Union refers the dispute to the Commission.
- 31 Jan 2014 Deputy President McCarthy decides for the union.
- 21 Feb 2014 ALS appeals under s 604.
- 11 and 12 Nov 2014 Full Court hears the union’s application.
- 28 Aug 2015 Full Court dismisses the application.
Two Commission rulings, opposite answers
Deputy President McCarthy published his decision on 31 January 2014 ([2014] FWC 692). He found that treating Canning Vale as the Company base for at least 10 years had established “the common understanding” of the term. He concluded: “The employee’s Company base is the Canning Vale premises of [ALS] and cannot be any of the three Alcoa sites, unless of course the Agreement is replaced or varied with different terms.” He also discussed the negotiations, “although I do not rely on it”.
ALS appealed on 21 February 2014. The Full Bench ([2014] FWCFB 3491) granted permission on the basis of “sufficient doubt” in the decision. It found that the words “do not, in our view, require the employee’s Company base to be a head or regional office”, and that their ordinary meaning “can comfortably accommodate the type of workplace at which the employees currently work where there are permanent Company facilities provided at that location”. ALS’s past practice was generous to employees, it said, but did not alter the meaning of the clause. In its view, “the correct analysis begins and ends with the interpretation of the words used in the clause, construed in their context”.
The union had framed four questions: whether each of the Kwinana, Pinjarra and Wagerup sites was a “site” for cl 15, and if so whether ALS could nominate any of them instead as a “Company base” under cl 15.5. The Full Bench answered all four “yes”. The Full Court identified its formal order as: “it is appropriate that we grant permission to appeal, allow the appeal, and substitute our answers to the questions posed by the parties upon the determination of the dispute.”
What the union asked the Federal Court to do
The union sought a writ of certiorari quashing the Full Bench’s decision and a writ of mandamus directing the Commission “to hear and determine the appeal in accordance with law”. The Commission said it would submit to any order, reserving its right to be heard on costs.
The union pleaded five grounds but pressed two. Its Context ground was that the Full Bench “failed to consider context in the interpretation of the Agreement”, put as an error on the face of the record and, alternatively, as jurisdictional error. Its Obligation ground was that the Full Bench breached s 577 of the Act by failing to act in a manner that “promotes harmonious and co-operative workplace relations”. The Court summarised: “In effect, the Union seeks to have the Full Bench’s decision quashed for jurisdictional error or error on the face of the record.” The union placed no final reliance on s 578.
Arbitration under an agreement is private, appeal included
that the constitutional writs should not issue for either kind of error because, before both the Deputy President and the Full Bench, the Commission was engaged in a private arbitration that was consensual and involved no public law function or government power.
that while the Deputy President acted as a private arbitrator, the Full Bench was hearing a statutory appeal under s 604 and so exercised only powers conferred by the Fair Work Act.
that the reference to arbitration in cl 37.3 Stage 4 “should be construed as including the appellate process identified in s 604”, and that the appeal was itself in the nature of an arbitration.
The Court started from the High Court’s decision in Gordonstone, which held that consensual dispute procedures in earlier industrial legislation established systems of private arbitration. It quoted the High Court: “Where parties agree to submit their differences for decision by a third party, the decision maker does not exercise judicial power, but a power of private arbitration.” From TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd v The Judges of the Federal Court of Australia, it drew Chief Justice French and Justice Gageler’s explanation that the reference to “private arbitration” was not to a private function but “to a function the existence and scope of which is founded on agreement as distinct from coercion”.
The Court said it was therefore “well settled” that arbitration by the Commission under a term of an enterprise agreement “is a private arbitration, based upon the consent of the parties, and not upon the coercive authority of the Australian state”. The only dispute was whether the appeal stage was different.
The union sought to distinguish Justice Rares’s decision in Linfox Australia Pty Ltd v Transport Workers’ Union of Australia, where the Full Bench acted “as a private arbitrator” under an agreement that expressly provided for an appeal. The Court described the Commission Full Bench decision in DP World Brisbane Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia as “perhaps most helpfully” addressing the point. There the Full Bench concluded that, absent a contrary provision in the agreement, the s 604 appeal procedure applies to private arbitrations under a dispute term, because parties “take the Commission as they find it, including the liability to appeal”.
Clause 37 and ss 595(3) and 739(4) all refer to “FWC”, not to its individual components, the Court said. The union advanced four reasons for treating the appeal as something other than private arbitration: the absence of a provision like s 170EC(1) of the earlier legislation considered in Flight West; the absence of an express appeal right as in Linfox; that the Act treats some appeals differently; and that s 740 allows arbitration by persons other than the Commission. On ss 375A, 400 and 779, which modify permission to appeal in particular matters, the Court said: “We see no merit in this submission. It involves nothing more than the arbitrary attribution of a purpose to the provisions in question”. On s 740, it said it “would be equally odd if parties who had chosen private arbitration were, in the event of an appeal, to be deprived of the perceived benefits of their choice.”
“The reference of a dispute for resolution by FWC is for resolution by that body, and not by one part of it”, the Court said. “It follows that if the parties intend that there be no appeal pursuant to s 604, they should say so.” It then concluded that cl 37.3 Stage 4 “should be construed as including the appellate process identified in s 604”, adding, with reference to DP World, that “the Full Bench’s powers on appeal will reflect the fact that the appeal is from a consent arbitration and is, itself, in the nature of an arbitration.” Judicial review of the Full Bench’s decision would, it said, also be shaped by that character.
Older cases did not carry the union’s argument
The union relied on Flight West Airlines Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Commission, where the Full Court had proceeded as though the writs would go to a private arbitration. The Court accepted that the absence of an equivalent to s 170EC(1) in the Fair Work Act offered a basis for distinguishing that case, but said it did not exclude parties including the appeal in their reference to arbitration. It noted Flight West preceded the High Court’s Gordonstone decision, so it was “hardly surprising” that neither the court nor the parties there addressed the availability of the writs.
The union conceded that Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Wagstaff Piling Pty Ltd indicates the writs will not go to correct an error of law in a private arbitration under the Fair Work Act, but called that a “suggestion”. The Court disagreed: Justices Buchanan and Katzmann “unequivocally said so”, and Justice Flick’s view was to similar effect.
The union also argued that ALS misunderstood Gordonstone, relying on Justice Brennan’s reasons in Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission for the proposition that judicial review may be granted for statutory functions as well as statutory powers. The Court noted that the New South Wales Court of Appeal and the Appeal Division of the Victorian Supreme Court had treated those views as inconsistent with authority, and found it unnecessary to go further. It declined the union’s invitation to infer that the High Court in Gordonstone proceeded on the basis that the writs would go: “We consider that such a conclusion cannot, safely or properly, be drawn.”
The Court did not treat the question as closed. Drawing on Re Cram; Ex parte NSW Colliery Proprietors’ Association Ltd, it observed that “it may also follow that, the Commonwealth Parliament having authorized the performance of private arbitrations by Commonwealth officers, such officers are similarly amenable to the writs when they so act.” It acknowledged this sits against the principle of the finality of a private arbitrator’s award, and said: “Difficult issues arise out of the interaction of the law relating to the constitutional writs and the consensual nature of the private arbitration process when it is conducted by a statutory body.”
The award is probably beyond the writs
The effect of Gordonstone and TCL, the Court said, is that an arbitrator’s power arises from the agreement to arbitrate, so “to the extent that FWC exercises power derived from such an agreement, it is not exercising government powers and so is not susceptible to the issue of the constitutional writs.” Where the Commission exercises a statutory power in the course of a private arbitration, which s 595(4) seems to permit, the Court said review by the writs might be available to third parties such as summoned witnesses but not against parties to the arbitration agreement. It did not decide the point because the union did not challenge any specific statutory power.
On the award itself, the Court said: “We are inclined to the view that it should generally be treated as the contractually binding outcome of the agreed dispute resolution process, not involving any exercise of government powers, and therefore not susceptible of review by way of the constitutional writs.” If that view is wrong, review would be available only for error of law on the face of the record.
A narrow record
Applying Craig v South Australia and Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales, the Court said the record ordinarily comprises “no more than the documentation which initiates the proceedings and thereby grounds the jurisdiction of the tribunal, the pleadings (if any) and the adjudication”. In Craig the High Court rejected including reasons and transcripts, which would go “a long way towards transforming certiorari into a discretionary general appeal for error of law”. Counsel for the union suggested Kirk had invited a challenge to Craig; the Court said “we are bound by that decision”. It rejected the union’s submission that the tribunal’s own choice determines the record: “Clearly, that proposition is not correct.”
Here the record comprised the Full Bench’s formal order together with its paragraphs setting out and answering the four questions, the notice of appeal, the union’s application of 20 November 2013 (both of which incorporate the 2012 Agreement), and the Deputy President’s award and reasons, because they limit the Full Bench’s powers on appeal. It did not include the evidence or the Full Bench’s reasons. “In any event we doubt the utility of the Union’s reliance upon error of law on the face of the record”, the Court said.
The negotiations showed disagreement, not a shared meaning
Assessing the Context ground, the Court noted that the Full Bench was conducting a private arbitration, and said: “No legislation or other legal requirement directed it to take into account any of these matters, subject only to the requirements of good faith and procedural fairness.” It said it may follow that, “for this reason alone”, the allegation of jurisdictional error must fail, but addressed the matters anyway.
The union relied on two documents of 6 and 7 September 2012. ALS’s “Company Agenda” said: “One current provision that places ALS at a disadvantage against its competitors is Travel Payments. The Company seeks to negotiate a change in how this term is applied.” The Court said this “clearly assumes that the existing clause is capable of achieving ALS’s objectives”, and added that “no significance can be attached to ALS’s desire to negotiate, rather than impose any change” because “Negotiation is good managerial practice.”
The Deputy President had found the evidence of two employee witnesses called by the union, that the ALS general manager involved in negotiations gave an undertaking not to change how the clause applied, more convincing than the manager’s denial. The Court said that view “seems to fall short of a finding that the undertaking was given”, and that the Deputy President had misunderstood the evidence. One witness gave no evidence of the statement. The other raised it first in supplementary oral evidence, saying the manager stated “very pointedly, that he had no intention of doing so.” The manager’s evidence was that he said: “It’s not our intention to change the company base, but if there’s an imperative put upon us then we will.” The Court said the statement “falls well short of being a guarantee”, and that there was no evidence an unconditional guarantee was given.
On the parties leaving the clause unchanged, the Court said: “The only inference that can be drawn is that the parties agreed to leave the question for resolution on another day.” The Full Bench “correctly concluded” the negotiation evidence was of no assistance.
On claimed common understanding, the union’s witnesses described the Alcoa site offices as owned and controlled by Alcoa, entered only with Alcoa access cards. ALS’s general manager said ALS had maintained bases at each site for over 15 years, with designated offices, crib rooms, dark rooms, permanently based site managers and over $1 million in test equipment, and that some Pinjarra buildings were owned or leased by ALS. The Court said that, beyond one witness’s “bare assertion”, there was “no evidence as to any shared knowledge” of the meaning of Company base. On whether travel was in the course of employment, it found the Deputy President’s distinction between an allowance and a payment hard to relate to “the construction of the power conferred upon ALS to vary an employee’s Company base”. On the award: “The Union has not demonstrated any useful purpose to be served by a consideration of the award. We are unable to identify any such purpose.” It did not accept that the Full Bench’s approach to context “was inconsistent with authority”.
Fairness, said the Court, runs both ways
Under the Obligation ground, the union’s particulars said the Full Bench reduced the remuneration of a significant number of employees “by anywhere up to, and possibly in excess of, $30,000 per annum”. The union acknowledged that paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of s 577 may be “facultative” and not “restrictive”, and did not try to show that no reasonable tribunal could have acted as the Full Bench did. It contended instead that s 577(d) was a “mandatory constraining obligation”. The Court described the submission as “little more than that it would be ‘unfair’” to allow ALS to nominate any site other than Canning Vale.
Drawing on Justice Lindgren’s reasons in Sun Zhan Qui v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, the Court said objectives in such a list will often be inconsistent among themselves, and failing to achieve one does not mean it was not attempted. A decision for the union “might be seen as not being fair and just to ALS”, it said, and it would “arguably be neither fair, nor just that one party should be able to escape the unfavourable outcome of a dispute resolution process to which it had agreed.” It concluded: “We see nothing disharmonious or uncooperative in the Full Bench’s decision”. Having rejected the Context ground, it found no error of law on the face of the record either.
An operational centre at each refinery
Though it said it may not be strictly necessary, the Court addressed cl 15 itself. It cited the Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of “base” as “an administrative or operational centre; the place at which a person, business, etc., is based” and the Macquarie Dictionary’s “a primary place of residence, employment, etc.” ALS accepted it could not simply nominate any geographical location. The union accepted ALS could nominate any location properly described as a base for its operations.
“We conclude that it was open to the Full Bench to find that ALS had established an operational centre at each Alcoa site”, the Court said. Employees start, finish and perform work there. The Court said: “The only real connection between them and Canning Vale appears to be that, until now, it has been their Company base for the purpose of calculating travel payments.” It added: “Once the history of the matter is set aside, it cannot be disputed that the Full Bench was entitled to dispose of the matter in the way that it did.”
The reasons were delivered jointly by Justices Dowsett, Tracey and Katzmann, sitting in Perth by videolink from Sydney. The application was heard on 11 and 12 November 2014 and judgment was delivered on 28 August 2015.
The Court ordered that the application be dismissed. Noting that s 570 of the Fair Work Act limits its capacity to award costs and that neither party had applied for them, it said it would make no costs order unless an application, with submissions of no more than two pages, was filed within 14 days, with any response due within 14 days after that, to be decided on the papers.
Source: [2015] FCAFC 123
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