Why is ALDI Foods Pty Limited v Shop, Distributive & Allied Employees Association relevant to workplace disputes in Australia?
The decisions OnNotice has reported cite the High Court’s decision on how an enterprise agreement attaches to an employee. A reference to an agreement covering or applying to an employee “in relation to particular employment” is a reference to the employee’s job as the agreement describes it. It is not a reference to whether the employee is doing that work at the time. The Full Bench of the Fair Work Commission has applied that reading in regulated labour hire arrangement orders and regulated labour hire disputes.
The decisions also cite it for three further points. The better off overall test is a global assessment of the agreement against the relevant modern award. The Act’s protective provisions bear on agreement making. An appeal to a Full Bench requires error to be shown. These citations appear in Full Bench appeals, in a Full Court of the Federal Court case about parliamentary privilege, and in Helensburgh Coal Pty Ltd v Bartley [2025] HCA 29, where the High Court referred to it on appeals from the Commission.
How the Commission and the courts use it
| Type of matter | What the decision said | What it means |
|---|---|---|
| Regulated labour hire arrangement order (s.306E) [2026] FWCFB 213 |
“Read without the SDA’s proposed gloss, it is apparent that the provision is simply referring to the employee’s job as described in the agreement rather than to the actual performance by the employee of the tasks” (the High Court majority at [75], quoted by the Full Bench) | The Full Bench used the High Court’s reading of particular employment to show that the assessment for a labour hire arrangement order has a different focus from deciding whether an agreement directly applies to an employee. |
| Regulated labour hire dispute (s.306P) [2026] FWCFB 102 |
“The reference to the ‘particular employment’ of an employee is to the description of the employee’s job in the agreement” (the Full Bench) | The Full Bench relied on it to read the labour hire pay provision as requiring the rate of pay that would be payable if the BMA Agreement applied to the employee’s employment with WorkPac. |
| Appeal (s.604) [2026] FWCFB 134 |
“The assessment as to whether an enterprise agreement passes the better off overall test requires a global assessment of the various terms and conditions of the agreement and the relevant modern award” (the Full Bench) | The Full Bench cited it for the global nature of the better off overall test, in holding that ALDI had to identify error of the House v The King kind. |
| Appeal (s.604) [2025] FWCFB 250 |
“In this regard, the protective provisions identified by the Full Court are the ‘fairly chosen’ requirement, the BOOT, and the requirement for ‘genuine agreement’.” (the Full Bench) | The Full Bench drew on the High Court’s account of the Act’s protective provisions, through the Full Court’s decision in One Key, in considering how the Act addresses concerns that such agreements may undermine collective bargaining. |
| Parliamentary privilege [2026] FCAFC 86 |
“While any such appeal would be by way of rehearing, it would still be necessary to establish error in the decisions made by the Deputy President” (the Full Court) | The Full Court cited it for the rule that an appeal to a Full Bench of the Commission, though by way of rehearing, still requires error to be shown. |
| Representative proceedings, misleading or deceptive conduct [2026] FCA 967 |
“without temporal significance” (Domino’s argument about the word employer, as the Federal Court recorded it) | Domino’s cited it in arguing that the word employer in the Pre-Reform WR Act could include a franchise operator that would commence operation in the future. |
Key principles and takeaways
- A reference to an enterprise agreement covering or applying to an employee in relation to particular employment refers to the employee’s job as described in the agreement, not to the actual performance of the tasks, as the Full Bench held in [2026] FWCFB 213 and [2026] FWCFB 102.
- The assessment for a regulated labour hire arrangement order has a different focus from deciding whether an enterprise agreement directly applies to an employee, according to the Full Bench in [2026] FWCFB 213.
- The better off overall test requires a global assessment of the agreement’s terms against the relevant modern award, and the Full Bench in [2026] FWCFB 134 held that an appeal against that assessment must identify error of the House v The King kind.
- An appeal to a Full Bench is by way of rehearing but still requires error to be established, as the Full Court said in [2026] FCAFC 86.
- The fairly chosen requirement, the better off overall test and the requirement for genuine agreement are the Act’s protective provisions in agreement making, as the Full Bench recorded in [2025] FWCFB 250.
What the Court decided
Seventeen ALDI employees who had accepted jobs in a South Australian region that was not yet trading could make an enterprise agreement for that region. The High Court so held in ALDI Foods Pty Limited v Shop, Distributive & Allied Employees Association [2017] HCA 53. The agreement did not have to be made as a greenfields agreement. The Court also agreed with the Full Court of the Federal Court that the Full Bench of the Fair Work Commission fell into jurisdictional error on the better off overall test (the BOOT). It sent that question back to the Full Bench.
At a glance
- Parties: ALDI Foods Pty Limited as General Partner of ALDI Stores (A Limited Partnership) (appellant); Shop, Distributive & Allied Employees Association (first respondent); Fair Work Commission (second respondent, submitting appearance)
- Citation: [2017] HCA 53 (M33/2017)
- Court: Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle, Gordon and Edelman JJ, judgment delivered 6 December 2017
- Provisions: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), ss 52, 53, 172, 182, 186(2)(a), 186(2)(d), 193
- Outcome: Appeal allowed in part. ALDI succeeded on the coverage issue and failed on the BOOT issue.
- Question decided: Whether the Commission has power under s 186(2)(a) to approve an enterprise agreement for a new enterprise made with existing employees who have agreed to work, but are not at that time actually working, in the new enterprise; and whether the Commission fell into jurisdictional error in being satisfied the agreement passed the BOOT.
Seventeen acceptances and a distribution centre still under construction
ALDI runs its retail stores in New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria as separate undertakings, one for each geographical region, and treats each region as its own enterprise. In early 2015 it was setting up a further undertaking at Regency Park, South Australia.
In April 2015 it sought expressions of interest from existing employees in other regions. In late May 2015 it made written offers to some of those who responded. Each offer said ALDI “wishes to offer you ongoing employment as [position] in our new Regency Park region in South Australia, commencing when the new region opens.” It added: “You will continue to be employed until that date in your current region and will be covered by that region’s enterprise agreement.”
Seventeen employees accepted. ALDI bargained with them under Part 2-4 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). Neither the Transport Workers’ Union of Australia (TWU) nor the Shop, Distributive & Allied Employees Association (SDA) acted as a bargaining representative. ALDI asked the employees under s 181(1) to vote on the ALDI Regency Park Agreement 2015. Of the 16 valid votes cast, 15 were in favour. Building work on the Regency Park distribution centre was unfinished at the time of the ballot, and no trading had started in the region.
ALDI applied for approval on 4 August 2015. Deputy President Bull decided the application on 22 September 2015, approving the Agreement with effect from 29 September 2015.
How it reached the High Court
The SDA and the TWU both appealed to a Full Bench of the Commission. Neither had taken part before the Deputy President, so the issues later argued in every forum were raised for the first time on that appeal. The unions contended the Agreement should have been a greenfields agreement and that it did not pass the BOOT. The Full Bench (Watson VP, Kovacic DP and Wilson C) rejected both contentions and dismissed the appeal.
The SDA then sought judicial review in the Full Court of the Federal Court. A majority (Katzmann and White JJ, Jessup J dissenting) found jurisdictional error in the Full Bench’s decision and granted the writs of certiorari and prohibition the SDA sought. Its orders were dated 29 November 2016. ALDI was granted special leave to appeal. The Commission filed submitting appearances in the Full Court and the High Court.
- Apr 2015 ALDI seeks expressions of interest for Regency Park.
- Late May 2015 ALDI makes written offers of employment.
- 4 Aug 2015 ALDI applies for approval of the Agreement.
- 22 Sep 2015 Deputy President Bull decides the application.
- 29 Sep 2015 Agreement operative.
- 29 Nov 2016 Full Court of the Federal Court makes orders for the SDA.
- 6 Dec 2017 High Court judgment delivered.
Four issues, two decided
The joint reasons of Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane, Nettle, Gordon and Edelman JJ identified four issues argued by the parties. The first was the coverage issue under s 186(2)(a). The second was whether a coverage error by the Commission was a jurisdictional error open to judicial review. The third was whether the Commission erred jurisdictionally in accepting that the Agreement met the BOOT required by s 186(2)(d). The fourth, raised by notice of contention, was whether the BOOT decision could be corrected by certiorari for error of law on the face of the record if the error fell short of jurisdictional error.
At [4] the joint reasons held “that the Full Court erred in its determination of the coverage issue, but decided the BOOT issue correctly.” That outcome meant neither the Full Court nor the High Court needed to decide the second and fourth issues.
Covering a job is not the same as working in it
The joint reasons drew on Part 2-1 of the Act. Under s 51 an agreement gives no entitlement and imposes no obligation unless it “applies” to the person. Under s 52(1) an agreement applies only if it is in operation and covers the person. Under s 53(1) an agreement covers an employee “if the agreement is expressed to cover (however described) the employee”.
From those provisions the joint reasons said at [25] that “an enterprise agreement may ‘cover’ an employee even though it does not yet ‘apply’ to that employee in the sense of imposing obligations on the employee and the employer.” An employee may be covered by more than one agreement at once, though only one can apply at a time. At [30]: “To speak of an employee being covered by an agreement is to speak of the agreement providing terms and conditions for the job performed by, or to be performed by, the employee.” The reference in s 53(6) to “particular employment” was read at [31] as a reference to the description of the employee’s job in the agreement.
At [42] the joint reasons said a non-greenfields agreement, once made by the employees’ vote, covers them even before it applies, because it is expressed to cover the jobs within its scope. In their words, “it is the charter of rights and duties for those who actually enter into employment under its terms.”
On s 186(2)(a), the joint reasons held at [77] that the question of coverage “is not whether the employees voting for the agreement are actually employed under its terms, but rather whether the agreement covers all employees who may in future have the terms and conditions of their jobs regulated by it.”
Greenfields depends on whom the employer already employs
(2) An employer, or 2 or more employers that are single interest employers, may make an enterprise agreement (a single-enterprise agreement): (a) with the employees who are employed at the time the agreement is made and who will be covered by the agreement; or (b) with one or more relevant employee organisations if: (i) the agreement relates to a genuine new enterprise that the employer or employers are establishing or propose to establish; and (ii) the employer or employers have not employed any of the persons who will be necessary for the normal conduct of that enterprise and will be covered by the agreement.
Under s 172(4), only an agreement made as referred to in s 172(2)(b) is a greenfields agreement. The joint reasons said at [22] that s 172 “does not contemplate that an enterprise agreement is a greenfields agreement simply because it relates to a new enterprise”, and that the section does not require an agreement for a new enterprise to be made as one.
The SDA argued that “employed” in s 172(2)(b)(ii) meant “employed in that new enterprise”. The joint reasons rejected that at [24], because the new enterprise, “ex hypothesi, does not yet exist.” Rather, “’employed’ simply means ’employed’ by that employer.” An agreement with persons already employed by the employer “must necessarily be made under s 172(2)(a) of the Act.”
A change of tense that carried little weight
The Full Court majority had relied on the shift from “will be covered” in ss 172 to 181 to “covered by” in ss 186 and 188. The joint reasons said at [78] the Full Court erred in giving that change an effect overriding s 172 and ss 52 and 53: “The change in tense is of no greater significance than to recognise that an agreement is not capable of covering an employee in any meaningful sense until it has been made.”
The joint reasons found support in s 207, which deals with variations. Section 207(4) pairs the future tense “will be necessary” with the present tense “are covered”. At [81] the joint reasons said this “makes it clear that the idea of coverage does not require an employee to be actually working under the terms of the agreement at the time he or she is said to be covered.” The need to qualify “are covered” with the words “have been employed”, they said, “confirms that the coverage of an agreement is wider than existing employees.”
Cimeco not followed, John Holland endorsed
Two earlier decisions were in play. In Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v John Holland Pty Ltd, the Full Court of the Federal Court recognised that an employee may be covered by more than one agreement at a time, and held that “the group of employees covered by the agreement” in s 186(3) meant “the whole class of employees to whom the agreement might in the future apply”. In Cimeco Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union, a Full Bench of the Commission had read “will be covered” in s 182(1) as referring to employees “actually falling within the coverage clause”, not those it was anticipated would be covered because they had been “mobilised” to the region.
The Full Bench in the ALDI matter declined to follow Cimeco and followed John Holland. The joint reasons agreed. At [82] they said a non-greenfields agreement may be made with as few as two employees, provided they are all of the employees then employed who are to fall under it when the vote is held, and “It does not matter that the agreement may, in due course, come to apply to many more employees.” At [83]: “To the extent that a different view was taken in Cimeco, it should not be followed.” They said the words “covered by” in s 186(2) may be understood as “those persons currently employed who fall within the whole class of employees to whom the agreement might in future apply”.
A few votes can bind many
White J in the Full Court had been troubled by the idea that the legislature would accept a small group of employees fixing the terms for everyone later employed in the enterprise. The joint reasons said at [84] that the concern “was adverted to and rejected in John Holland” and is “addressed, and largely allayed, by the protective provisions of the Act relating to the right to representation, the ‘fairly chosen’ provisions of sub-ss (3) and (3A) of s 186, and, most importantly, the need to pass the BOOT.”
At [86] they noted that in a small existing enterprise “it is uncontroversial that the votes of a few original employees may eventually bind a much larger group as the enterprise grows.” At [87] they said the Full Court majority “ignored the language of s 172 and adopted a strained construction of s 186(2)(a)”, and that nothing in the Act’s purpose justified that reading.
Equalisation on request is not ‘better off’
Before the Full Bench, the SDA adduced new evidence. It compared the entitlements of 10 of the 17 employees under the Agreement with their entitlements under the General Retail Industry Award 2010. The SDA used that evidence to argue that 40 per cent of employees would be paid less under the Agreement than under the award.
ALDI relied on a comparison clause in cl 13. The clause allowed an employee who considered they were not better off overall to request a comparison, and provided: “Any shortfall in total remuneration which would otherwise be payable under the Modern Award will be paid to the Employee in the next pay period after the review is completed.” The Full Bench held: “This clause creates an enforceable right to payments to employees equal to or higher than those contained in the award.”
that the SDA’s new evidence deserved little or no weight because it did not reflect the hours to be worked under the Agreement, left out important components of pay, and placed employees at substantially higher classifications than under a similar agreement recently approved with the SDA’s support. It also argued that the comparison clause ensured employees would benefit from favourable movements in the award after the BOOT was satisfied.
that the BOOT “requires an overall assessment to be made”, which “requires the identification of terms which are more beneficial for an employee, terms which are less beneficial and an overall assessment of whether an employee would be better off under the agreement”.
that the SDA’s submission must be accepted. The comparison clause “was apt only to ensure that an employee could make a request for payments to be equalised as between the Agreement and an award.” The benefit of the clause’s updating effect might properly be weighed, but the Full Bench’s reasons did not show how the BOOT was met at the test time.
At [93] the joint reasons contrasted the BOOT with its predecessor, the “no disadvantage” test, and said: “The right to equalisation, after a process initiated by the employee, does not of itself leave the employee better off under the Agreement at the test time.” At [99] they said whether an employee was better off overall “required an evaluative assessment after consideration of the provisions of the award and the Agreement that may have been more beneficial to employees and those that may have been less beneficial”.
New evidence received, never weighed
The joint reasons said at [95] that although the new evidence was received by the Full Bench, “the factual issues which it raised were not expressly resolved”. At [96]: “On a fair reading of the reasons of the Full Bench, it did not engage in any comparison between the Agreement and the modern award.” The evidence might deserve little weight, “but the Full Bench fell into jurisdictional error in failing to determine whether or not that was so.”
The joint reasons described the appeal to the Full Bench as a rehearing, in which s 607(2) permits further evidence to be admitted. At [100] they said: “The Full Bench was wrong to approach its task as if it were enough to conclude that Bull DP had ‘properly considered the BOOT and reached a decision based on a sound analysis’.” Once it admitted the evidence, it had to decide the appeal “upon the facts and in accordance with the law as it exists at the time of hearing the appeal.” By failing to carry out the evaluative assessment, the Full Bench “misconceived its role and so fell into jurisdictional error”, the joint reasons said at [98].
Special leave stood despite ALDI’s concession
The SDA asked the Court to revoke ALDI’s special leave. It argued that ALDI had conceded in the Full Court that no employees were “covered by” the Agreement when it was made. The joint reasons said the concession may have been predicated on the SDA’s construction being correct, and that ALDI “at no stage abandoned its reliance upon s 172 of the Act.” At [90] they added that “the coverage issue is a matter of public importance which should not be allowed to stand wrongly decided merely because of an ill-advised and plainly erroneous concession upon a matter of law by a party to the proceeding.” The application was refused.
Gageler J on whose agreement counts
Gageler J agreed with the orders and the plurality’s reasons and added one observation on coverage. He agreed with John Holland that the “group” in s 186(3) and (3A) is the whole class of employees to whom the agreement might in future apply. But the employees in s 186(2)(a) “cannot extend” to that totality, because satisfaction of genuine agreement would be impossible for persons not yet employed or known.
For Gageler J, s 186(2)(a) refers to a subclass: “those who were employed at the time the agreement was made and became covered by the agreement as a result of it having been made.” For this Agreement, those employees “were limited to the 17 existing employees of ALDI who at the time of making that Agreement had already contracted to work in the Regency Park region in the future.”
The orders
The joint reasons stated: “ALDI’s appeal to this Court succeeds in relation to the coverage issue and fails in relation to the BOOT issue.” The Court, in matter M33/2017, allowed the appeal in part. It set aside orders 1, 2(b) and 3 of the Full Court dated 29 November 2016. In their place, the Court allowed in part the SDA’s originating application for relief under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), and ordered that a writ of mandamus issue to the Commission requiring it to decide according to law the SDA’s appeal against Deputy President Bull’s 22 September 2015 decision and orders in matter AG2015/3510.
The reasons at [104] state that a writ of certiorari should issue to quash the Full Bench decision, and that the Full Bench must determine according to law whether the ALDI Regency Park Agreement 2015 passes the BOOT in s 193. They also state that the part of the SDA’s application concerned with the Deputy President’s decision under s 186 should be dismissed. The parties had agreed that, on this split result, the BOOT question should go back to the Commission. The Court chose certiorari and mandamus over a simple remittal because the Full Bench decision “was affected by jurisdictional error which must be formally corrected”.
Source: [2017] HCA 53
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